Behind the Bloodbath
in Gaza
Foiling Another Palestinian
Peace Offensive
Norman Finkelstein
CounterPunch
January 28, 2009
Early speculation on the motive behind Israelâs slaughter in Gaza that began
on 27 December 2008 and continued till 18 January 2009 centered on the
upcoming elections in Israel. The jockeying for votes was no doubt a factor
in this Sparta-like society consumed by ârevenge and the thirst for blood,â
where killing Arabs is a sure crowd-pleaser. (Polls during the war showed
that 80-90 percent of Israeli Jews supported it.) But as Israeli journalist
Gideon Levy pointed out on Democracy Now!, âIsrael went through a very
similar warâŠtwo-and-a-half years ago [in Lebanon], when there were no
elections.â When crucial state interests are at stake, Israeli ruling elites
seldom launch major operations for narrowly electoral gains. It is true that
Prime Minister Menachem Beginâs decision to bomb the Iraqi OSIRAK reactor
in 1981 was an electoral ploy, but the strategic stakes in the strike on Iraq were
puny; contrary to widespread belief, Saddam Hussein had not embarked on
a nuclear weapons program prior to the bombing. The fundamental motives
behind the latest Israeli attack on Gaza lie elsewhere: (1) in the need to
restore Israelâs âdeterrence capacity,â and (2) in the threat posed by a new
Palestinian âpeace offensive.â
Israelâs âlarger concernâ in the current offensive, New York Times Middle
East correspondent Ethan Bronner reported, quoting Israeli sources, was to
âre-establish Israeli deterrence,â because âits enemies are less afraid of
it than they once were, or should be.â Preserving its deterrence capacity
has always loomed large in Israeli strategic doctrine. Indeed, it was the
main impetus behind Israelâs first-strike against Egypt in June 1967 that
resulted in Israelâs occupation of Gaza (and the West Bank). To justify the
onslaught on Gaza, Israeli historian Benny Morris wrote that â[m]any
Israelis feel that the wallsâŠare closing inâŠmuch as they felt in early June
1967.â Ordinary Israelis no doubt felt threatened in June 1967, butâas
Morris surely knowsâthe Israeli leadership experienced no such trepidation.
After Israel threatened and laid plans to attack Syria, Egyptian President
Gamal Abdel Nasser declared the Straits of Tiran closed to Israeli shipping,
but Israel made almost no use of the Straits (apart from the passage of oil,
of which Israel then had ample stocks) and, anyhow, Nasser did not in
practice enforce the blockade, vessels passing freely through the Straits
within days of his announcement. In addition, multiple U.S. intelligence
agencies had concluded that the Egyptians did not intend to attack Israel
and that, in the improbable case that they did, alone or in concert with other
Arab countries, Israel wouldâin President Lyndon Johnsonâs wordsââwhip
the hell out of them.â The head of the Mossad told senior American officials
on 1 June 1967 that âthere were no differences between the U.S. and the
Israelis on the military intelligence picture or its interpretation.â The
predicament for Israel was rather the growing perception in the Arab world,
spurred by Nasserâs radical nationalism and climaxing in his defiant
gestures in May 1967, that it would no longer have to follow Israeli orders.
Thus, Divisional Commander Ariel Sharon admonished those in the Israeli
cabinet hesitant to launch a first-strike that Israel was losing its âdeterrence
capabilityâŠour main weaponâthe fear of us.â Israel unleashed the June 1967
war âto restore the credibility of Israeli deterrenceâ (Israeli strategic
analyst Zeev Maoz).
The expulsion of the Israeli occupying army by Hezbollah in May 2000 a
major new challenge to Israelâs deterrence capacity. The fact that Israel
suffered a humiliating defeat, one celebrated throughout the Arab world,
made another war well-nigh inevitable. Israel almost immediately began
planning for the next round, and in summer 2006 found a pretext when
Hezbollah captured two Israeli soldiers (several others were killed in the
firefight) and demanded in exchange the release of Lebanese prisoners held
by Israel. Although Israel unleashed the fury of its air force and geared up
for a ground invasion, it suffered yet another ignominious defeat. A respected
American military analyst despite being partial to Israel nonetheless
concluded, âthe IAF, the arm of the Israel military that had once destroyed
whole air forces in a few days, not only proved unable to stop Hezbollah
rocket strikes but even to do enough damage to prevent Hezbollahâs rapid
recoveryâ; that âonce ground forces did cross into LebanonâŠ, they failed to
overtake Hezbollah strongholds, even those close to the borderâ; that âin
terms of Israelâs objectives, the kidnapped Israeli soldiers were neither
rescued nor released; Hezbollahâs rocket fire was suppressed, not even its
long-range fireâŠ; and Israeli ground forces were badly shaken and bogged
down by a well-equipped and capable foeâ; and that âmore troops and a
massive ground invasion would indeed have produced a different outcome,
but the notion that somehow that effort would have resulted in a more
decisive victory over HezbollahâŠhas no basis in historical example or logic.â
The juxtaposition of several figures further highlights the magnitude of the
setback: Israel deployed 30,000 troops as against 2,000 regular Hezbollah
fighters and 4,000 irregular Hezbollah and non-Hezbollah fighters; Israel
delivered and fired 162,000 weapons whereas Hezbollah fired 5,000 weapons
(4,000 rockets and projectiles at Israel and 1,000 antitank missiles inside
Lebanon). Moreover, âthe vast majority of the fighters who defended villages
such as Ayta ash Shab, Bint Jbeil, and Maroun al-Ras were not, in fact,
regular Hezbollah fighters and in some cases were not even members of
Hezbollah,â and âmany of Hezbollahâs best and most skilled fighters never
saw action, lying in wait along the Litani River with the expectation that
the IDF assault would be much deeper and arrive much faster than it did.â
Yet another indication of Israelâs reversal of fortune was that, unlike any
of its previous armed conflicts, in the final stages of the 2006 war it fought
not in defiance of a U.N. ceasefire resolution but in the hope of a U.N.
resolution to rescue it.
After the 2006 Lebanon war Israel was itching to take on Hezbollah again,
but did not yet have a military option against it. In mid-2008 Israel
desperately sought to conscript the U.S. for an attack on Iran, which would
also decapitate Hezbollah, and thereby humble the main challengers to its
regional hegemony. Israel and its quasi-official emissaries such as Benny
Morris threatened that if the U.S. did not go along âthen non-conventional
weaponry will have to be used,â and âmany innocent Iranians will die.â To
Israelâs chagrin and humiliation, the attack never materialized and Iran has
gone its merry way, while the credibility of Israelâs capacity to terrorize
slipped another notch. It was high time to find a defenseless target to
annihilate. Enter Gaza, Israelâs favorite shooting gallery. Even there the
feebly armed Islamic movement Hamas had defiantly resisted Israeli diktat,
in June 2008 even compelling Israel to agree to a ceasefire.
During the 2006 Lebanon war Israel flattened the southern suburb of Beirut
known as the Dahiya, where Hezbollah commanded much popular support.
In the warâs aftermath Israeli military officers began referring to the âDahiya
strategyâ: âWe shall pulverize the 160 Shiite villages [in Lebanon] that
have turned into Shiite army bases,â the IDF Northern Command Chief
explained, âand we shall not show mercy when it comes to hitting the
national infrastructure of a state that, in practice, is controlled by
Hezbollah.â In the event of hostilities, a reserve Colonel at the Israeli
Institute for National Security Studies chimed in, Israel needs âto act
immediately, decisively, and with force that is disproportionateâŠ.Such a
response aims at inflicting damage and meting out punishment to an extent
that will demand long and expensive reconstruction processes.â The new
strategy was to be used against all of Israelâs regional adversaries who had
waxed defiantââthe Palestinians in Gaza are all Khaled Mashaal, the Lebanese
are all Nasrallah, and the Iranians are all Ahmadinejadââbut Gaza was the
prime target for this blitzkrieg-cum-bloodbath strategy. âToo bad it did not
take hold immediately after the âdisengagementâ from Gaza and the first
rocket barrages,â a respected Israeli columnist lamented. âHad we
immediately adopted the Dahiya strategy, we would have likely spared
ourselves much trouble.â After a Palestinian rocket attack, Israelâs
Interior Minister urged in late September 2008, âthe IDF shouldâŠdecide on a
neighborhood in Gaza and level it.â And, insofar as the Dahiya strategy
could not be inflicted just yet on Lebanon and Iran, it was predictably
pre-tested in Gaza.
The operative plan for the Gaza bloodbath can be gleaned from authoritative
statements after the war got underway: âWhat we have to do is act
systematically with the aim of punishing all the organizations that are
firing the rockets and mortars, as well as the civilians who are enabling
them to fire and hideâ (reserve Major-General); âAfter this operation there
will not be one Hamas building left standing in Gazaâ (Deputy IDF Chief of
Staff); âAnything affiliated with Hamas is a legitimate targetâ (IDF
Spokespersonâs Office). Whereas Israel killed a mere 55 Lebanese during the
first two days of the 2006 war, the Israeli media exulted at Israelâs âshock
and aweâ (Maariv) as it killed more than 300 Palestinians in the first two
days of the attack on Gaza. Several days into the slaughter an informed
Israeli strategic analyst observed, âThe IDF, which planned to attack
buildings and sites populated by hundreds of people, did not warn them in
advance to leave, but intended to kill a great many of them, and succeeded.â
Morris could barely contain his pride at âIsraelâs highly efficient air
assault on Hamas.â The Israeli columnist B. Michael was less impressed by
the dispatch of helicopter gunships and jet planes âover a giant prison and
firing at its peopleâ âfor example, â70âŠtraffic cops at their graduation
ceremony, young men in desperate search of a livelihood who thought theyâd
found it in the police and instead found death from the skies.â
As Israel targeted schools, mosques, hospitals, ambulances, and U.N.
sanctuaries, as it slaughtered and incinerated Gazaâs defenseless civilian
population (one-third of the 1,200 reported casualties were children),
Israeli commentators gloated that âGaza is to Lebanon as the second sitting
for an exam is to the firstâa second chance to get it right,â and that this
time around Israel had âhurled [Gaza] back,â not 20 years as it promised to
do in Lebanon, but âinto the 1940s. Electricity is available only for a few
hours a dayâ; that âIsrael regained its deterrence capabilitiesâ because
âthe war in Gaza has compensated for the shortcomings of the [2006] Second
Lebanon Warâ; and that âThere is no doubt that Hezbollah leader Hassan
Nasrallah is upset these daysâŠ.There will no longer be anyone in the Arab
world who can claim that Israel is weak.â
New York Times foreign affairs expert Thomas Friedman joined in the chorus
of hallelujahs. Israel in fact won the 2006 Lebanon war, according to
Friedman, because it had inflicted âsubstantial property damage and
collateral casualties on Lebanon at large,â thereby administering an
âeducationâ to Hezbollah: fearing the Lebanese peopleâs wrath, Hezbollah
would âthink three times next timeâ before defying Israel. He expressed hope
that Israel was likewise âtrying to âeducateâ Hamas by inflicting a heavy
death toll on Hamas militants and heavy pain on the Gaza population.â To
justify the targeting of Lebanese civilians and civilian infrastructure
Friedman asserted that Israel had no other option because âHezbollah created
a very âflatâ military networkâŠdeeply embedded in the local towns and
villages,â and that because âHezbollah nested among civilians, the only
long-term source of deterrence was to exact enough pain on the civiliansâŠto
restrain Hezbollah in the future.â
Leaving aside Friedmanâs hollow coinagesâwhat does âflatâ mean?âand
leaving aside that he alleged that the killing of civilians was unavoidable but
also recommends targeting civilians as a âdeterrenceâ strategy: is it even true
that Hezbollah was âembedded in,â ânested among,â and âintertwinedâ with
the Lebanese civilian population?
Hereâs what Human Rights Watch concluded after an exhaustive
investigation:
âwe found strong evidence that Hezbollah stored most of its rockets
in bunkers and weapon storage facilities located in uninhabited fields
and valleys, that in the vast majority of cases Hezbollah fighters left
populated civilian areas as soon as the fighting started, and that
Hezbollah fired the vast majority of its rockets from pre-prepared
positions outside villages.â
And again,
âin all but a few of the cases of civilian deaths we investigated,
Hezbollah fighters had not mixed with the civilian population or
taken other actions to contribute to the targeting of a particular home
or vehicle by Israeli forces.â Indeed, âIsraelâs own firing patterns in
Lebanon support the conclusion that Hezbollah fired large numbers of
its rockets from tobacco fields, banana, olive and citrus groves, and
more remote, unpopulated valleys.â
A U.S. Army War College study based largely on interviews with Israeli
participants in the Lebanon war similarly found that:
âthe key battlefields in the land campaign south of the Litani River
were mostly devoid of civilians, and IDF participants consistently
report little or no meaningful intermingling of Hezbollah fighters and
noncombatants. Nor is there any systematic reporting of Hezbollah
using civilians in the combat zone as shields.â
On a related note, the authors report that âthe great majority of
Hezbollahâs fighters wore uniforms. In fact, their equipment and clothing
were remarkably similar to many state militariesââdesert or green fatigues,
helmets, web vests, body armor, dog tags, and rank insignia.â
Friedman further asserted that, ârather than confronting Israelâs Army
head-on,â Hezbollah fired rockets at Israelâs civilian population to provoke
Israeli retaliatory strikes, inevitably killing Lebanese civilians and
âinflaming the Arab-Muslim street.â Yet, numerous studies have shown, and
Israeli officials themselves conceded that, during its guerrilla war against
the Israeli occupying army, Hezbollah only targeted Israeli civilians after
Israel targeted Lebanese civilians. In conformity with past practice
Hezbollah started firing rockets toward Israeli civilian concentrations
during the 2006 war only after Israel inflicted heavy casualties on Lebanese
civilians, while Hezbollah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah avowed that it
would target Israeli civilians âas long as the enemy undertakes its
aggression without limits or red lines.â
If Israel targeted the Lebanese civilian population and infrastructure
during the 2006 war, it was not because it had no choice, and not because
Hezbollah had provoked it, but because terrorizing the civilian population
was a relatively cost-free method of âeducation,â much to be preferred over
fighting a real foe and suffering heavy casualties, although Hezbollahâs
unexpectedly fierce resistance prevented Israel from achieving a victory on
the battlefield. In the case of Gaza it was able both to âeducateâ the
population and achieve a military victory becauseâin the words of Gideon
Levyâthe âfighting in Gazaâ wasâwar deluxe.â
Compared with previous wars, it is childâs playâpilots bombing unimpeded
as if on practice runs, tank and artillery soldiers shelling houses and
civilians from their armored vehicles, combat engineering troops destroying
entire streets in their ominous protected vehicles without facing serious
opposition. A large, broad army is fighting against a helpless population
and a weak, ragged organization that has fled the conflict zones and is
barely putting up a fight.
The justification put forth by Friedman in the pages of the Times for
targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure amounted to apologetics for
state terrorism. It might be recalled that although Hitler had stripped Nazi
propagandist Julius Streicher of all his political power by 1940, and his
newspaper Der StĂŒrmer had a circulation of only some 15,000 during the war,
the International Tribunal at Nuremberg nonetheless sentenced him to death
for his murderous incitement.
Beyond restoring its deterrence capacity, Israelâs main goal in the Gaza
slaughter was to fend off the latest threat posed by Palestinian moderation.
For the past three decades the international community has consistently
supported a settlement of the Israel-Palestine conflict that calls for two
states based on a full Israeli withdrawal to its June 1967 border, and a
âjust resolutionâ of the refugee question based on the right of return and
compensation. The vote on the annual U.N. General Assembly resolution,
âPeaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine,â supporting these terms
for resolving the conflict in 2008 was 164 in favor, 7 against (Israel, United
States, Australia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau), and 3
abstentions. At the regional level the Arab League in March 2002
unanimously put forth a peace initiative on this basis, which it has
subsequently reaffirmed. In recent times Hamas has repeatedly signaled its
own acceptance of such a settlement. For example, in March 2008 Khalid
Mishal, head of Hamasâs Political Bureau, stated in an interview:
There is an opportunity to deal with this conflict in a manner different
than Israel and, behind it, the U.S. is dealing with it today. There is
an opportunity to achieve a Palestinian national consensus on a
political program based on the 1967 borders, and this is an exceptional
circumstance, in which most Palestinian forces, including Hamas, accept
a state on the 1967 bordersâŠ.There is also an Arab consensus on this
demand, and this is a historic situation. But no one is taking advantage
of this opportunity. No one is moving to cooperate with this
opportunity. Even this minimum that has been accepted by the
Palestinians and the Arabs has been rejected by Israel and by the U.S.
Israel is fully cognizant that the Hamas Charter is not an insurmountable
obstacle to a two-state settlement on the June 1967 border. â[T]he Hamas
leadership has recognized that its ideological goal is not attainable and will
not be in the foreseeable future,â a former Mossad head recently observed.
â[T]hey are ready and willing to see the establishment of a Palestinian state
in the temporary borders of 1967âŠ.They know that the moment a Palestinian
state is established with their cooperation, they will be obligated to change
the rules of the game: They will have to adopt a path that could lead them
far from their original ideological goals.â
In addition, Hamas was âcareful to maintain the ceasefireâ it entered into
with Israel in June 2008, according to an official Israeli publication,
despite Israelâs reneging on the crucial component of the truce that it ease
the economic siege of Gaza. âThe lull was sporadically violated by rocket
and mortar shell fire, carried out by rogue terrorist organizations,â the
source continues. âAt the same time, the [Hamas] movement tried to enforce
the terms of the arrangement on the other terrorist organizations and to
prevent them from violating it.â Moreover, Hamas was âinterested in
renewing the relative calm with Israelâ (Shin Bet head Yuval Diskin).
The Islamic movement could thus be trusted to stand by its word, making
it a credible negotiating partner, while its apparent ability to extract
concessions from Israel, unlike the hapless Palestinian Authority doing
Israelâs bidding but getting no returns, enhanced Hamasâs stature among
Palestinians. For Israel these developments constituted a veritable
disaster. It could no longer justify shunning Hamas, and it would be only a
matter of time before international pressure in particular from the
Europeans would be exerted on it to negotiate. The prospect of an incoming
U.S. administration negotiating with Iran and Hamas, and moving closer to
the international consensus for settling the Israel-Palestine conflict, which
some U.S. policymakers now advocate, would have further highlighted
Israelâs intransigence. In an alternative scenario, speculated on by Nasrallah,
the incoming American administration plans to convene an international
peace conference of âAmericans, Israelis, Europeans and so-called Arab
moderatesâ to impose a settlement. The one obstacle is âPalestinian resistance
and the Hamas government in Gaza,â and âgetting rid of this stumbling
block isâŠthe true goal of the war.â
In either case, Israel needed to provoke Hamas into breaking the truce, and
then radicalize or destroy it, thereby eliminating it as a legitimate negotiating
partner. It is not the first time Israel confronted such a diabolical threatâ
an Arab League peace initiative, Palestinian support for a two-state
settlement and a Palestinian ceasefireâand not the first time it embarked on
provocation and war to overcome it.
In the mid-1970s the PLO mainstream began supporting a two-state
settlement on the June 1967 border. In addition, the PLO, headquartered in
Lebanon, was strictly adhering to a truce with Israel that had been
negotiated in July 1981. In August 1981 Saudi Arabia unveiled, and the Arab
League subsequently approved, a peace plan based on the two-state
settlement. Israel reacted in September 1981 by stepping up preparations to
destroy the PLO. In his analysis of the buildup to the 1982 Lebanon war,
Israeli strategic analyst Avner Yaniv reported that Yasser Arafat was
contemplating a historic compromise with the âZionist state,â whereas âall
Israeli cabinets since 1967â as well as âleading mainstream dovesâ opposed
a Palestinian state. Fearing diplomatic pressures, Israel maneuvered to
sabotage the two-state settlement. It conducted punitive military raids
âdeliberately out of proportionâ against âPalestinian and Lebanese
civiliansâ in order to weaken âPLO moderates,â strengthen the hand of
Arafatâs âradical rivals,â and guarantee the PLOâs âinflexibility.â However,
Israel eventually had to choose between a pair of stark options: âa political
move leading to a historic compromise with the PLO, or preemptive
military action against it.â
To fend off Arafatâs âpeace offensiveââYanivâs telling phraseâIsrael
embarked on military action in June 1982. The Israeli invasion âhad been
preceded by more than a year of effective ceasefire with the PLO,â but after
murderous Israeli provocations, the last of which left as many as 200
civilians dead (including 60 occupants of a Palestinian childrenâs
hospital), the PLO finally retaliated, causing a single Israeli casualty.
Although Israel used the PLOâs resumption of attacks as the pretext for its
invasion, Yaniv concluded that the âraison dâĂȘtre of the entire operationâ
was âdestroying the PLO as a political force capable of claiming a
Palestinian state on the West Bank.â It deserves passing notice that in his
new history of the âpeace process,â Martin Indyk, former U.S. ambassador
to Israel, provides this capsule summary of the sequence of events just
narrated: âIn 1982, Arafatâs terrorist activities eventually provoked the Israeli
government of Menachem Begin and Ariel Sharon into a full-scale invasion
of Lebanon.â
Fast forward to 2008. Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni stated in early
December 2008 that although Israel wanted to create a temporary period of
calm with Hamas, an extended truce âharms the Israeli strategic goal,
empowers Hamas, and gives the impression that Israel recognizes the
movement.â Translation: a protracted ceasefire that enhanced Hamasâs
credibility would have undermined Israelâs strategic goal of retaining
control of the West Bank. As far back as March 2007 Israel had decided on
attacking Hamas, and only negotiated the June truce because âthe Israeli
army needed time to prepare.â Once all the pieces were in place, Israel only
lacked a pretext. On 4 November, while the American media were riveted on
election day, Israel broke the ceasefire by killing seven Palestinian
militants, on the flimsy excuse that Hamas was digging a tunnel to abduct
Israeli soldiers, and knowing full well that its operation would provoke
Hamas into hitting back. âLast weekâs âticking tunnel,â dug ostensibly to
facilitate the abduction of Israeli soldiers,â Haaretz reported in
mid-November
was not a clear and present danger: Its existence was always known
and its use could have been prevented on the Israeli side, or at least the
soldiers stationed beside it removed from harmâs way. It is impossible
to claim that those who decided to blow up the tunnel were simply
being thoughtless. The military establishment was aware of the
immediate implications of the measure, as well as of the fact that the
policy of âcontrolled entryâ into a narrow area of the Strip leads to the
same place: an end to the lull. That is policyânot a tactical decision
by a commander on the ground.
After Hamas predictably resumed its rocket attacks â[i]n retaliationâ
(Israeli Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center), Israel could embark
on yet another murderous invasion in order to foil yet another Palestinian
peace offensive.
Â
Â
Notes.
1. Gideon Levy, âThe Time of the Righteous,â Haaretz (9 January 2009).
2. Ethan Bronner, âIn Israel, A Consensus That Gaza War Is a Just One,â New
York Times (13 January 2009).
3. DemocracyNow! 29 December 2008;
http://www.democracynow.org/2008/12/29/israeli_attacks_kill_over_310_in
4. Richard Wilson, âIncomplete or Inaccurate Information Can Lead to
Tragically Incorrect Decisions to Preempt: The example of OSIRAK,â paper
presented at Erice, Sicily (18 May 2007; updated 9 February 2008;
http://www.normanfinkelstein.com/article.php?pg=11&ar=1589
5. Ethan Bronner, âIsrael Reminds Foes That It Has Teeth,â New York Times
(29 December 2008).
6. Benny Morris, âWhy Israel Feels Threatened,â New York Times (30 December
2008). l “_ednref7″âMemorandum for the Recordâ (1 June 1967), Foreign
Relations of the United States, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967
(Washington, DC: 2004).
8. Tom Segev, 1967: Israel, the war, and the year that transformed the
Middle East (New York: 2007), p. 293, my emphasis.
9. Zeev Maoz, Defending the Holy Land: A critical analysis of Israelâs
security and foreign policy (Ann Arbor: 2006), p. 89.
10. William Arkin, Divining Victory: Airpower in the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah
war (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: 2007), pp. xxi, xxv-xxvi, 25, 54, 64, 135,
147-48.
11. Andrew Exum, Hizballah at War: A military assessment (Washington
Institute for Near East Policy: December 2006), pp. 9, 11-12.
12. Benny Morris, âA Second Holocaust? The Threat to Israelâ (2 May 2008;
http://www.mideastfreedomforum.org/de/node/66
13. Yaron London, âThe Dahiya Strategyâ (6 October 2008;
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3605863,00.html
Gabriel Siboni, âDisproportionate Force: Israelâs concept of response in
light of the Second Lebanon War,â Institute for National Security Studies
(INSS), 2 October 2008. Attila Somfalvi, âSheetrit: We should level Gaza
neighborhoodsâ (2 October 2008;
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3504922,00.html
14. Israeli General Says Hamas Must Not Be the Only Target in Gaza,â IDF
Radio, Tel Aviv, in Hebrew 0600 gmt (26 December 2008), BBC Monitoring
Middle East; Tova Dadon, âDeputy Chief of Staff: Worst still aheadâ (29
December 2008;
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3646462,00.html
http://www.btselem.org/English/Gaza_Strip/20081231_Gaza_Letter_to_Mazuz.asp
15. Seumas Milne, âIsraelâs Onslaught on Gaza is a Crime That Cannot
Succeed,â Guardian (30 December 2008).
16. Reuven Pedatzur, âThe Mistakes of Cast Lead,â Haaretz (8 January 2009).
17. Morris, âWhy Israel Feels Threatened.â
18. B. Michael, âDĂ©jĂ Vu in Gazaâ (29 December 2008;
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3646558,00.html
19. Gideon Levy, âTwilight Zone/Trumpeting for War,â Haaretz (2 January
2009).
20. Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, âIsrael and Hamas Are Both Paying a
Steep Price in Gaza,â Haaretz (10 January 2009); Ari Shavit, âAnalysis:
Israelâs victories in Gaza make up for its failures in Lebanon,â Haaretz (12
January 2009); Guy Bechor, âA Dangerous Victoryâ (12 January 2009;
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3654505,00html
21. Thomas L. Friedman, âIsraelâs Goals in Gaza?,â New York Times (14
January 2009).
22. Human Rights Watch, Why They Died: Civilian casualties in Lebanon during
the 2006 war (New York: 2007), pp. 5, 14, 40-41, 45-46, 48, 51, 53.
23. Stephen Biddle and Jeffrey A. Friedman, The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and
the Future of Warfare: Implications for army and defense policy (Carlisle,
PA: 2008), pp. 43-44, 45.
24. Human Rights Watch, Civilian Pawns: Laws of war violations and the use
of weapons on the Israel-Lebanon border (New York: 1996); Maoz, Defending
the Holy Land, pp. 213-14, 224-25, 252; Augustus Richard Norton, Hezbollah:
A short history (Princeton: 2007), pp. 77, 86.
25. Judith Palmer Harik, Hezbollah: The changing face of terrorism (London:
2004), pp. 167-68.
26. Human Rights Watch, Civilians Under Attack: Hezbollahâs rocket assault
on Israel in the 2006 war (New York: 2007), p. 100. HRW asserts that
Hezbollah rocket attacks on Israeli civilians were not retaliatory but
provides no supporting evidence.
27. Gideon Levy, âThe IDF Has No Mercy for the Children in Gaza Nursery
Schools,â Haaretz (15 January 2009).
28. Glenn Greenwald, âTom Friedman Offers a Perfect Definition of
âTerrorismââ (14 January 2009;
http://www.salon.com/opinion/greenwald/2009/01/14/friedman/
29. Mouin Rabbani, âA Hamas Perspective on the Movementâs Evolving Role:
An interview with Khalid Mishal, Part II,â Journal of Palestine Studies (Summer
2008).
30. âWhat Hamas Wants,â Mideast Mirror (22 December 2008).
31. Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Israel Intelligence
Heritage and Commemoration Center, The Six Months of the Lull Arrangement
(December 2008), pp. 2, 6, 7.
32. âHamas Wants Better Terms for Truce,â Jerusalem Post (21 December 2008).
Diskin told the Israeli cabinet that Hamas would renew the truce if Israel
lifted the siege of Gaza, stopped military attacks and extended the truce to
the West Bank.
33. Richard N. Haass and Martin Indyk, âBeyond Iraq: A new U.S. strategy for
the Middle East,â and Walter Russell Mead, âChange They Can Believe In: To
make Israel safe, give Palestinians their due,â in Foreign Affairs,
January-February 2009.
34. Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallahâs Speech Delivered
at the Central Ashura Council, 31 December 2008.
35. Noam Chomsky, The Fateful Triangle: the United States, Israel and the
Palestinians (Boston: 1983), chaps. 3, 5.
36. Yehuda Lukacs (ed), The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: a documentary
record, 1967-1990 (Cambridge: 1992), pp. 477-79.
37. Yehoshaphat Harkabi, Israelâs Fateful Hour (New York: 1988), p. 101.
38. Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: The abduction of Lebanon (New York: 1990),
pp. 197, 232.
39. Avner Yaniv, Dilemmas of Security: Politics, strategy and the Israeli
experience in Lebanon (Oxford: 1987), pp. 20-23, 50-54, 67-70, 87-89, 100-1,
105-6, 113, 143.
40. Martin Indyk, Innocent Abroad: An intimate account of American peace
diplomacy in the Middle East (New York: 2009), p. 75.
41. Saed Bannoura, âLivni Calls for a Large Scale Military Offensive in
Gaza,â IMEMC & Agencies (10 December 2008;
http://www.imemc.org/article/57960
42. Uri Blau, âIDF Sources: Conditions not yet optimal for Gaza exit,â
Haaretz (8 January 2009); Barak Ravid, âDisinformation, Secrecy, and Lies:
How the Gaza offensive came about,â Haaretz (28 December 2008).
43. Zvi Barâel, âCrushing the Tahadiyeh,â Haaretz (16 November 2008). Cf.
Uri Avnery, âThe Calculations behind Israelâs Slaughter of Palestinians in
Gazaâ (2 January 2009;
http://www.redress.cc/palestine/uavnery20080102
44. The Six Months of the Lull Arrangement, p. 3
_____________________________________________________________________
Norman Finkelstein is author of five books, including Image and Reality of
the Israel-Palestine Conflict, Beyond Chutzpah and The Holocaust Industry,
which have been translated into more than 40 foreign editions. He is the
son of Holocaust survivors. This article is an edited extract of the views of
Finkelstein given at DemocracyNow.org. His website is
http://www.NormanFinkelstein.com.