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THE BIOPSYCHOLOGY OF COOPERATION 7 Opposition to the Cooperative Movement The British cooperative movement in the early years of the 19th century drew its inspiration from the Benthamites, a highly influential group whose primary philosophical concern was to place free market capitalism on a rational and ethical footing. Bentham himself was initially a supporter of Owen’s endeavours to reform working-class conditions. However, whereas the cooperative movement was primarily concerned with the ethical defects of capitalism and promoted socialist solutions, the Benthamites became increasingly preoccupied with its rational defects. When the consequences of the socialist program became apparent, James Mill,28 a prominent Benthamite, was horrified. He wrote: Their notions of property look ugly… they seem to think that it should not exist, and that the existence of it is an evil to them. Rascals, I have no doubt, are at work among them.29 Bertrand Russell cites these words (written in 1831) as “the beginning of the long war between Capitalism and Socialism”.30 The economic debates at this time are interesting, if for no other reason than that they appear not to have changed much in a century and a half. Bentham believed that free labour markets would enable workers to move from one place of employment to another and so choose their employers, thereby curbing the excess power of capitalists. Owen, on the other hand, recognized that in an age of machines, those few who owned machines could control the labour market and thereby bend the workers to their will. He understood what so few understand even today, that in free markets the question of who has market power is all important. Owen’s solution was the cooperative one, that machines should be owned collectively so that the benefits of machine automation might be shared by those who worked them. Note that a cooperative economy does not imply the abolition of private property but rather introduces another mode of ownership in addition to public and private. In pursuit of his vision, Owen and many of his followers set up intentional communities as experiments in cooperative living. The reasoning was simple – if the human character is moulded by life experience, in particular early childhood experience, then the way to a better world cannot be purely concerned with the factory floor. The entire social order itself must be changed to ensure that good life experience can shape people of good character. These experiments in community living were a failure and it is important to understand why. At least three factors suggest themselves. First, many of the persons involved in the early cooperative communities appeared to have had little aptitude for what they were attempting. New Harmony, Owen’s own attempt to set up a model cooperative community in Indiana, USA, 1826, collapsed when one of his business partners ran off with the money.31 Another attempt in Glasgow also failed. In the words of Owen’s 8 UNDERSTANDING PROUT – VOLUME 1 son, the persons who joined these experimental communities were “a heterogeneous collection of radicals... honest latitudinarians, and lazy theorists, with a sprinkling of unprincipled sharpers thrown in”.32 Second, the community lifestyle required participants to accept a uniformity of purpose and circumstances. It was too much to ask. Contemplating the failure of New Harmony, Josiah Warren wrote: We had a world in miniature – we had enacted the French revolution over again with despairing hearts instead of corpses as a result... It appeared that it was nature’s own inherent law of diversity that had conquered us... our “united interests” were directly at war with the individualities of persons and circumstances and the instinct of self-preservation...33 Warren went on to become an advocate for individualist anarchism – this in itself says something about the diversity of minds with which Owen had to contend. But there is no doubt that the requirement for a uniformity of mind and purpose contributed to the failure of the early utopian communities. Third, the British government of the day rejected the cooperative agenda, both the business model to improve working conditions and the social model to address deficiencies in public education, health and welfare. Instead they chose the laissez-faire doctrine of minimum government intervention.34 The Australian economist and academic Hugh Stretton believes that laissez-faire cost Britain dearly. The French, Germans and Americans were subsequently to become greater industrial powers because their governments became economically involved by promoting public education, public science, public investment and “abler public services”.35 Owen devoted much of his life to lobbying politicians. He fought the commonly held view of his day that the poor were sub-human, the “savages at home”,36 for whom education would add cunning to vice. Articles appeared in The Economist magazine (which was then, as now, a proponent of laissezfaire) providing the theoretical justification for such views.37 Owen’s failure to overturn prejudice by moral argument disillusioned him with politics and he sought, instead, to create the ideal society by establishing working examples of it. But in a society which rejects cooperation, it is not easy to create a shining example of it. Owen’s success at New Lanark is, therefore, all the more remarkable. In conclusion, we must be careful to assess the cooperative movement of the first half of the 19th century with a view to its achievements as well as its failures. On the positive side, the movement changed forever the conditions considered acceptable for working-class people. It promoted child care, public education, public health and equal rights for women, all of which today are considered the norm in a democratic society. The other part of the cooperative legacy was the elaboration of a new business model, the consumer and worker cooperative. The Rochedale pioneers established the principles of cooperation THE BIOPSYCHOLOGY OF COOPERATION 9 which survive to this day. On the negative side, the early experiments in intentional communities appear naive in hindsight. The failure of some of the early consumer and worker cooperatives are best judged as experiments in a new business model.38 While the cooperative movement was struggling with its failures, Marx and Engels appeared on the stage with a new ingredient to add to the socialist mix, class struggle. Owen of course recognized class antagonisms, but he attempted to establish his ideal within the established social order. In the Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels disparaged this approach and drew a distinction between themselves as scientific socialists and the cooperative movement as utopian socialists. The term utopian socialists has stuck. Utopian socialists, declared Marx and Engels: consider themselves far superior to all class antagonisms. They want to improve the condition of every member of society, even that of the most favoured. Hence, they habitually appeal to society at large, without distinction of class; nay, by preference, to the ruling class. For how can people, when once they understand their system, fail to see in it the best possible plan of the best possible state of society? Hence, they reject all political, and especially all revolutionary, action; they wish to attain their ends by peaceful means, and endeavour, by small experiments, necessarily doomed to failure, and by the force of example, to pave the way for the new social Gospel.39 In 1880, Engels published a simpler and shorter account of the new scientific socialism, under the title Socialism – Utopian and Scientific.40 Its grand visions captured the imagination of a younger generation. Historical materialism could explain the past and the future. The liberation of the working class was an historical inevitability. By comparison, the utopian socialists offered only an ethical ideal with no apparent means to realize it. Socialism, said Engels, was not just a new idea discovered by Owen and his followers, but rather the necessary outcome of a historical struggle between two classes, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. The requirement of the day was not to build model communities but to strike at the source of class enmity, the economic relations between the two classes. Trade union membership increased rapidly from 1880 to the end of the century and the cooperative movement also enjoyed a resurgence, partly due to rising living standards of workers and partly because, as Cole puts it, every “trade unionist was always a potential cooperator...”41 But over the same period the two movements took different paths. Cole again: “In the eighties trade unionism and consumers’ cooperation went on their several ways, each shedding much of its earlier idealism, and each settling down to consolidate its position within somewhat narrowly delimited fields.”42 The cooperative movement expanded more easily into consumer cooperatives which engaged labour “in the ordinary labour market…” and were not therefore seen as 10 UNDERSTANDING PROUT – VOLUME 1 offering the same benefits to workers as producer cooperatives. Towards the end of the 19th century, the cooperative movement equipped itself with all the formal apparatus of a large national organization, holding annual congresses with delegates from regional and local levels. It also began publishing a newspaper, The Cooperative News. And, despite the difficulties, there was also a gradual expansion of producer cooperatives during this period.43 The Cooperative Movement into the 20th Century Marxism split the socialist movement in two, those supporting the revolutionary approach through the vehicle of Communist parties, and those supporting a gradual approach through moderate Labor parties. In Britain, 1884, the gradualists formed the Fabian Society, which continues to this day to be the social conscience of the British Labour Party. It promotes the welfare state but does not challenge the power of the private enterprise sector on which the welfare state depends. By the late 19th century, the cooperative movement had lost its initial momentum and fervour. Revolutionary socialists had rejected cooperatives in favour of state-owned enterprises44 and liberal capitalism had made only those grudging compromises with the welfare state it deemed politically necessary. The cooperative ideal continued to get political support from Fabian socialists,45 but the focus of the socialist struggle had moved elsewhere. However, it should not be forgotten that the cooperative movement continued to spread around the world in the late 19th century and first half of the 20th century in the form of agricultural cooperatives and credit unions. They especially found a role in the newly emerging frontiers of the USA and Australia where government administration and infrastructure had not yet penetrated. Farmers had to fend for themselves and found it advantageous to form cooperatives through which they could process and market their produce. Two impressive examples of cooperative economies in the 20th century deserve special mention, that of Yugoslavia (on a national scale) and that of Mondragon, Spain (on a regional scale). Yugoslavia during the 1960s and 70s provides a unique example of a predominantly worker cooperative national economy. In Yugoslav Socialism: Theory and Practice, Harold Lydall46 makes some interesting comparisons between the Yugoslav and Mondragon approaches to worker cooperatives. A critical difference between them concerns income reinvested for capital formation – in Mondragon cooperatives it is owned by the worker/members whilst in the Yugoslav case it was collectively owned by the state. In Lydall’s view, worker management in Yugoslav cooperatives was more a public relations exercise than real. As he puts it, a “one-party Marxist regime… is fundamentally incompatible with selfmanagement, since it does not really trust the workers to make their own THE BIOPSYCHOLOGY OF COOPERATION 11 decisions”.47 He prefers instead the Mondragon model to which we shall return at various points in this essay. To sum up the 20th century experience, we may say that although cooperative economics was not highly visible compared to private enterprise capitalism and state enterprise communism, it nevertheless survived in pockets in an otherwise hostile world. This says much about the inherent resiliance of cooperation. Fascism Not much will be said of Fascism in this essay, because it is not a sustainable social system. Like a pathogen, it only draws sustenance from societies that are already sick. However it is of interest philosophically because it is the polar opposite of cooperation. 20th century Fascism grew out of 19th century European Romanticism.48 As represented by the German philosopher Nietzsche (1844-1900), it celebrates the will of great men to do great deeds.49 Great deeds require great resources which are gathered through imperial conquest. The suffering of the masses is of no account if it is in the service of great men. Nietzsche alludes habitually to ordinary human beings as the bungled and the botched and as having no independent right to happiness or well-being. He regards any sign of empathy or compassion as a weakness: The object is to attain that enormous energy of greatness which can model the man of the future by means of discipline and also by means of the annihilation of millions of the bungled and the botched, and which can yet avoid going to ruin at the sight of the suffering created thereby, the like of which has never been seen before.50 One glimpses in this passage a terrible premonition – Nazi Germany some 50 years later. The question arises in Nietzsche’s philosophy – how to determine a great man and how to determine a great deed? Great men are those who rise to the top through struggle and war. And these men must be great by birth because if such accomplishments could be achieved by learning, this would suggest an equality that Nietzsche is nowhere prepared to acknowledge. Great deeds are determined by great men for “no morality is possible without good birth” and “every elevation of Man is due to aristocratic society”.51 It comes as no surprise that Nietzsche despised women (“we should think of women as property”) and Christianity (because it cultivates slave morality). It should be noted that Robert Owen and many other 19th century socialists also argued against religion. But whereas socialists objected to religion because it checked the advancement of the common person, Nietzsche objected to it weakening the resolve of a great man. The common person was of no account. Writing in 1943, while Nazi Germany was still a formidable power, Bertrand Russell remarks on a particular feature of Nietzsche’s philosophy – the complete absence of empathy.52 Indeed, Nietzsche explicitly preached against 12 UNDERSTANDING PROUT – VOLUME 1 it. Only three years later, a psychologist, Dr. Gustav Gilbert, was assigned by the U.S. Army to study the minds and motivations of the Nazi defendants at the Nuremberg tribunals. The following year, he published a diary containing transcripts of his conversations with the prisoners. The one characteristic he found all the defendants to have in common was a lack of empathy. In a 2000 TV dramatization of the Nuremberg trials, the Gilbert character says: I told you once that I was searching for the nature of evil. I think I’ve come close to defining it: a lack of empathy. It’s the one characteristic that connects all the defendants: a genuine incapacity to feel with their fellow man. Evil, I think, is the absence of empathy. In an essay motivated by the Nuremburg dramatization, journalist Ernest Partridge says: Empathy, the capacity to recognize and cherish in other persons, the experience, emotions and aspirations that one is aware of in oneself, is the moral cornerstone of progressive politics. It is a principle recognized and taught in all the great world religions, reiterated by numerous moral philosophers, and validated by the scientific study of human personality.53 In conclusion, it seems relevant to note that Nietzsche, the champion of the superman and the despiser of the bungled and botched, was for most of his life incapacitated by bad health. He retired from a university position, incapable of work, at the age of 35. He went insane aged 44 and remained so to his death twelve years later. Matter-Centred Philosophy In Socialism – Utopian and Scientific, Engels introduced Marxism as a synthesis of French socialism, German philosophy and English economics. It is not the intention of this section to offer a comprehensive account of Marxist philosophy. Our interest is primarily with Marx’s treatment of ethics and the human character. How did Marx hope to create a better society? How did he contend with the question of human nature? What was the practical outcome of his scientific socialism?
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